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Abstract
This article examines the policies employed by United Nations (UN) peacekeeping lead-
ership and mid-level staff to silence West Papuan anti-Indonesian activists and dismiss the
population’s political opinions as immaterial to their territory’s sovereign future. The UN
brokered the New York Agreement, legitimising Indonesia’s claims to the region following a
decade of international discussions and military skirmishes between Indonesia and the
Netherlands over the territory of West Papua. The Agreement vested the UN with sov-
ereign control of West Papua for seven months to facilitate the transition in authority from
Dutch colonial rule. Drawing on a multi-archival study of the mission, this article offers
depth and balance to previous high-policy-focused scholarship on the dispute, rendering
mid-level peacekeepers visible and bringing their role in shaping peacekeeping practices to
light. It illuminates how the mission staff dismissed the views of West Papuan representa-
tives in 1962–3 and contributed to the project of disenfranchisement carried out by the
Indonesian government. In doing so, the mission leadership decisively participated in the re-
colonisation of the population and disregarded rights violations on the ground.
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As the military strategies of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in
Congo increasingly attracted negative attention in the global media, the UN lead-
ership struggled to restore the organisation’s reputation as a guardian of interna-
tional peace and security.1 It was in this context of institutional anxiety, debt and
escalating geopolitical pressure that the General Assembly authorised a novel form
of peacekeeping intervention that sought to transfer the Dutch-colonised territory
of West Papua to Indonesian authority: the United Nations Temporary Executive
Authority (UNTEA).2 The UN leadership constructed the UNTEA mandate upon
the logic of Dutch census and administrative information, uncritically conceiving
the host population as wholly underdeveloped and politically illiterate.3 However,
once the UNTEA officials arrived on the ground, the peacekeeping staff met mul-
tiple Papuan activist groups, regional councils and political parties demanding self-
determination. Driven by organisational pressure and racial prejudices, the
UNTEA leadership reacted to Papuan demands by suppressing anti-Indonesian
protests in the pursuit of a smooth transition to Indonesian authority. Focusing on
mid-level peacekeeping officials’ gatekeeping logic, practices and consequences
helps to reveal the individual roles played by mid-level international civil servants
in reshaping structures of state sovereignty during decolonisation. The mission
leadership characterised the population in internal reports as not yet ready for
self-determination, driven by racialised assessments of the Papuan population as
well as imperialistic motivations to prevent potential geopolitical threats in the
Pacific region. By preserving imperial conceptions of the absence of political life
in the territory, the UNTEA staff adopted the same gatekeeping rhetoric and
paternalistic role as the previous Dutch colonial administration, facilitating the
take-over of an authoritarian government that continues to retain power today.4
The organisation’s first plenary international territorial administration provid-
ed an opportunity for the leadership to reassert the institution’s expertise in con-
flict resolution and intervene in a rapidly escalating crisis.5 The concept of an
international ‘trusteeship’ or ‘protectorate’ over the region of West Papua had
been floating unsuccessfully between the involved parties for some time.
Indonesian diplomats based in the Netherlands’ Embassy first suggested this
kind of international arrangement in 1959.6 The Dutch and Indonesians initially
1 T.J. Hamilton, ‘U. N. under pressure: financial crisis and criticism of policy beset world organiza-
tion’, The New York Times (11 February 1962).
2 UN Document, General Assembly, A/RES/1752(XVII), ‘Agreement between the Republic of
Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning West New Guinea (West Irian)’, 1127th
plenary meeting, 21 September 1962.
3 UN Archives (Henceforth, UNARMS), S-0075-0001-07, ‘New Guinea’, 1962.
4 V. Kuitenbrouwer, ‘Beyond the ‘Trauma of Decolonisation’: Dutch cultural diplomacy during the
West New Guinea question (1950–62)’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 44, 2
(2016), 313.
5 R. Wilde, International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilising Mission Never
Went Away (Oxford 2008), 60.
6 US Department of State: Office of the Historian, ‘Despatch From the Embassy in the Netherlands to
the Department of State’, Foreign Relations of the United States 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII,
Document 223, 3 September 1959.
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demonstrated no intention of compromising on their aims for the future of West
Papua as they were emerging from a decade of increasingly tense relations follow-
ing the latter’s own successful independence campaign. Indonesia had relied upon
its history of shared Dutch imperial administration to drive their claims to ‘reunite’
West Papua with the rest of the archipelago having attained independence from the
Netherlands in 1949.7 However, following a decade of international discussions
and military skirmishes between Indonesia and the Netherlands in the Pacific
Ocean, the conflict began to ignite anti-Soviet fears within the UN leadership
and US government. Dutch historian Vincent Kuitenbrouwer described this vola-
tile context as, ‘on the brink of war, and skirmishes claimed the lives of dozens of
soldiers on both sides’.8 UN leadership’s concerns about Indonesia’s materiel reli-
ance on the Soviet Union intensified in January 1962 during Operation Trikora
where the two nations allied in a military operation to annex West Papua.9
The American President, John F Kennedy, privately discussed his fears with
Thant about the territory’s on-going instability as it held a significant geographic
position in the Pacific Ocean and, more broadly, Asia.10 These perceived risks to
international security drove Thant to orchestrate a settlement that would allow the
UN to preserve an amicable diplomatic relationship with Djakarta without repre-
sentation of or consultation with the West Papuan population.11 The UN’s man-
date for protecting international peace and security and reification of the
Westphalian state system thus became an obstacle in the provision of rights-led
peacekeeping operations.
The UNTEA mission demonstrated the disconnect between principles projected
by the UN headquarters and the practices in the field as the re-colonisation of the
West Papuan population violated the General Assembly’s recent Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.12 The result of
these negotiations, known as the ‘New York Agreement’, formally recognised
Indonesia’s claims to West Papua and requested a peacekeeping mission to control
the transfer of sovereignty. A successful vote in the General Assembly vested the
UN with administrative authority over West Papua and its five hundred thousand
inhabitants for seven months to guarantee law and order and facilitate the tran-
sition.13 The geopolitical fears and organisational desire to demonstrate its
7 R.E. Elson, ‘Marginality, morality, and the nationalist impulse: Papua, the Netherlands and
Indonesia: a review article’, Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden
(2006), 4/5.
8 Kuitenbrouwer, ‘Beyond the ‘Trauma of Decolonisation’’, 310.
9 E.T. Pauker, ‘Indonesia: “The year of the triumph”’, Current History, 43, 255 (1962), 274.
10 US Department of State: Office of the Historian, ‘Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the
Department of State’, Foreign Relations of the United States 1961–1963, Southeast Asia, Volume XXIII,
Document 218, 27 December 1961.
11 T. Banivanua-Mar, Decolonisation and the Pacific: Indigenous Globalisation and the Ends of Empire
(Cambridge 2016), 147/8.
12 UN Doc, A/RES/1514(XV), ‘Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries
and peoples’, 14 December 1960.
13 UNARMS, S-0700-0005-14, ‘Report on education in West Irian’, 25 March 1963, p. 3.
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operational capabilities manifested in the UN leadership choosing to prioritise the
diffuse the geopolitical threat of a powerful nation, Indonesia.
This was a period of organisational crisis for the UN staff. UN General
Assembly delegates feared that the organisation was under threat and there was
an urgent need to re-establish member states’ confidence in the UN’s operational
capabilities following the death of secretary-general Dag Hammarskj€old in
September 1961.14 This institutional pressure was compounded further following
a series of military manoeuvres during the Congo mission (ONUC) and a signif-
icant financial crisis, marring the perceived capability and credibility of the organ-
isation’s decision-making in the field.15 While the first armed peacekeeping
mission, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), had been relatively suc-
cessful in establishing stability in Egypt following the Suez crisis,16 the ‘storm of
criticism’ during the Congo mission shook the reputational and financial standing
of the organisation within the international community.17 Thus, the UN’s role in
the negotiation process between the Dutch and Indonesians was a much-needed
and hard-won victory in the eyes of U Thant.18 UNTEA was the organisation’s
first international territorial administration since its forebear organisation, the
League of Nations, occupied the Saar in 1920, thus, functionally expanding the
organisation further.19 Thant also ensured that the mission was financed equally
by Indonesia and the Netherlands, providing the UN some much-needed fiscal
respite from the combined operations of UNEF and ONUC.20 This ‘victory’
encouraged an organisational impulse to protect the delicate diplomatic arrange-
ment from crumbling due to complications on the ground.21 The success of the
Thant in resolving the two countries’ claims to the territory – and avoiding the
outbreak of war – was a precarious but rejuvenating moment for the organisation.
Thus, the West Papuan conflict emerged at the height of post-colonial anxieties,
hierarchies and debates, and became entangled in broader organisational alliances
and fantasies for the new international order during decolonisation.22 The practical
14 UNARMS, S-0876-0001-06-00001, ‘Internal report from Engers to Thant’, 17 August 1962, p. 8;
Hamilton, ‘U.N. under pressure’, The New York Times (11 February 1962).
15 A. O’Malley, The Diplomacy of Decolonisation: America, Britain and the United Nations During the
Congo Crisis 1960–64 (Manchester 2018), 120.
16 British National Archives (Henceforth, BNA), FO 371/129792/UN.1117/108, ‘Telegram from New
York to Foreign Office: text of Minister of State for Foreign Affairs’ speech in today’s plenary debate’,
22 November 1957.
17 Hamilton, ‘U.N. under pressure’, The New York Times (11 February 1962).
18 U. Thant, ‘3. From transcript of press conference, Geneva, 3 May 1963’, in A. Cordier and M.
Harrelson (eds) Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations: Volume VI, U Thant,
1961–1964 (New York 1976), 337.
19 Ralph Wilde establishes that ‘Despite the exceptionalist suggestions made by some commentators,
international organisations have been involved in the conduct of territorial administration since the
start of the League of Nations . . . The first plenary international territorial administration [project was]
the Saar in 1920 (in the League era)’ in Wilde, International Territorial Administration, 60.
20 T.J. Hamilton, ‘U. N. under pressure’, The New York Times (11 February 1962).
21 U. Thant, View from the UN (London 1978), 48.
22 The author recognises the important contributions of scholars such as Todd Shepard, A.G.
Hopkins, and Stuart Ward (2016) in criticising vague uses of the term ‘decolonisation’ and revealing
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implicationsofmultipleself-determinationcampaignsduringdecolonisationwerethe
developmentofhierarchieswithin thepost-independence internationalorderbetween
older and newer, smaller and larger and well-resourced and less well-resourced
nations.23 As more colonial nations achieved independence, many sought to expand
their borders and make sovereignty claims on neighbouring or proximate regions.
Protectorates which had previously been within vast national borders – such as the
Dutch East Indies – became heated points of dispute between colonial and post-
colonial states, as well as ideological opportunities for Cold War superpowers.24
Although there was vocal anti-colonial rhetoric emerging from the General
Assembly andUNCommittees during the early 1960s,25 some of the most dominant
anti-colonial governments – such as Indonesia – simultaneously repressed indepen-
dence campaigns inWest Papua and East Timor and sought to re-colonise these ter-
ritories for political gain.26 As Brad Simpson has argued, ‘Many of the countries that
deployed self-determination claimswith thegreatest fervourafter 1945, suchas India,
Indonesia and Algeria, denied them even more fiercely when made by restive ethnic
and regionalminorities within their borders’.27 TheUN staff’s prioritisation of inter-
national security over domestic politics created new modes of systematic disenfran-
chisementwhichwere euphemised in the languageof international diplomacy.Rather
thanbeingperipheral orpassive in the recalibrationof sovereigntyduringdecolonisa-
tion, theUNleadershipandpeacekeeping staff providedacrucial legitimising role for
powerful states’ neo-colonial aspirations.
In recent years there has been a surge in scholarship on the historical subject-
hood of international organisations, their staff and (in)formal networks.28
Historians have begun to investigate the influence of non-state actors and
the trend of homogenising agents calling for decolonisation. Although these terms (‘decolonisation’ and
‘recolonisation’) were not in circulation during the period examined in this article, many scholars in this
field have used these terms to refer to the particular processes of political and constitutional transfer in
West Papuan history. It is this conversation that this article seeks to intervene in and, as such, has used
these terms to further nuance understanding of how the UN mid-level staff were complicit in this
process of ‘recolonisation’: For example: D. Webster, ‘Narratives of colonization, decolonization and
recolonization in Papua’, Archive History. Available at: http://activehistory.ca/papers/history-paper-3/;
T. Banivanua-Mar, ‘“A thousand miles of cannibal lands”: imagining away genocide in the re-
colonization of West Papua’, Journal of Genocide Research, 10, 4: pp. 583–602 (2008); J. Pouwer,
‘The colonisation, decolonisation and recolonisation of West New Guinea’, The Journal of Pacific
History, 34, 2: pp. 157–179 (1999).
23 A. Getachew, Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination (Princeton 2018);
M. Spanu, ‘The hierarchical society: the politics of self-determination and the constitution of new states
after 1919’, European Journal of International Relations, 26, 2 (2020), 372–96.
24 L. Walker, ‘Decolonization in the 1960s: on legitimate and illegitimate nationalist claims-making’,
Past & Present, 242, 1 (2019), 227–64.
25 S.L.B. Jensen, The Making of International Human Rights: The 1960s, Decolonization, and the
Reconstruction of Global Values (Cambridge 2016); J.L. Pearson, ‘Defending Empire at the United
Nations: the politics of international colonial oversight in the Era of Decolonisation’, The Journal of
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 45, 3 (2017), 525–49.
26 M. Fibiger, ‘A diplomatic counter-revolution: Indonesian diplomacy and the invasion of East
Timor’, Modern Asian Studies (2021), 55, 1: pp. 587–628.
27 B. Simpson, ‘The United States and the Curious History of Self-Determination’, Diplomatic
History, Vol. 36:4 (2012), 676.
28 E. Manela, ‘International society as a historical subject’, Diplomatic History, 44, 2 (2020), 184–209.
Tudor 5
international organisations during decolonisation, as territorial borders and legal
claims to sovereignty reshaped the geography of the Global South.29 During the
decolonisation period, mid-level UN staff, specifically international peacekeeping
staff deployed to the field, navigated the increasingly fluid rules of sovereignty
during decolonisation for institutional benefit. The West Papua territorial dispute
demonstrates that the UN’s international relations paradigm was fundamentally
challenged by decolonisation processes and the increasing ‘territorialisation of
political identity’ during the early 1960s.30 The structure of the UN in the post-
war context entrenched an unequal international order whereby only nation-state
status could provide access to the forums of global decision-making. For minority
or indigenous groups within post-colonial territories, the evolving nation-state
international order required them to immediately develop a popular nationalist
movement or be recolonised. This re-constructed regional allegiances, instrumen-
talised pre-colonial heritage for post-colonial claims, and presented only the pro-
tection of nationalisation to those who refused re-colonisation or annexation.
Many works on the Indonesian takeover of West Papua have successfully con-
textualised the UNTEA mission in regional Cold War politics and state instrumen-
talisation of the territory for ‘anti-colonial’ diplomatic credentials. This
scholarship focuses on the Dutch-Indonesian dispute and negotiations,31 or, on
the unrepresentative plebiscite of 1969 as primary sites of Papuan betrayal.32
Throughout the 1950s, Indonesia and the Netherlands internationalised their posi-
tion, both paradoxically pursuing anti-colonial credentials, on West Papuan sov-
ereignty. Neither achieved universal success in the public forum of the General
Assembly or privately through diplomatic interactions with other state represen-
tatives during this period.33 The Dutch government argued that, if it retained
29 D. Webster, ‘Development advisors in a time of cold war and decolonization: the United Nations
Technical Assistance Administration, 1950–59’, Journal of Global History, 6, 2 (2011), 249–72; E.
Muschik, ‘Managing the world’; E. Muschik, ‘‘A pretty kettle of fish’: United Nations assistance in
the mass dismissal of labor in the Iranian oil industry, 1959–1960’, Labor History, 60, 1 (2019), 8–23; D.
Bhouraskar, United Nations Development Aid: A Study in History and Politics (New Delhi 2007); D.
Maul, Human Rights, Development and Decolonization: The International Labour Organization, 1940–70
(New York 2012); G.F. Sinclair, ‘Forging modern states with imperfect tools: United Nations technical
assistance for public administration in decolonized states’, Humanity, 11, 1 (2020), 54–83.
30 J. MacArthur, ‘Decolonizing sovereignty: states of exception along the Kenya-Somali Frontier’,
The American Historical Review, 124, 1 (2019), 109; D. B. Carter and H. E. Goemans, ‘The making of
the territorial order: new borders and the emergence of interstate conflict’, International Organization,
65, 2 (2011), 275–309.
31 C.L.M. Penders, The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonisation and Indonesia 1945–1962
(Honolulu 1971; D. Webster, ‘Self-determination abandoned: the road to the New York: agreement on
West New Guinea (Papua), 1960–62’, Indonesia, 95 (2013); D. Easter, ‘Active Soviet military support
for Indonesia during the 1962 West New Guinea crisis’, Cold War History, 15, 2 (2015); J. Pouwer, ‘The
colonisation, decolonisation and recolonisation of West New Guinea’, The Journal of Pacific History,
34, 2 (1999); Kuitenbrouwer, ‘Beyond the “Trauma of Decolonisation”’.
32 P. Drooglever, An Act of Free Choice: Decolonisation and the Right to Self-Determination in West
Papua (London 2009); J. Saltford, ‘United Nations involvement with the act of self-determination in
West Irian (Indonesian West New Guinea) 1968 to 1969’, Indonesia, 69 (2000).
33 C. Brown, ‘Indonesia’s West Irian case in the UN General Assembly, 1954’, Journal of Southeast
Asian Studies, 7, 2 (1976), 261.
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colonial power over the territory, it would ensure that the population would be
given access to self-determination when they were ready for a plebiscite, thus
adopting a gatekeeping role built upon paternalistic logic.34 Whereas, the
Indonesian government maintained that their own experience of colonisation
and founding role in the Bandung Conference in 1955 abdicated their government
of any neo-colonial aspirations.35 The Bandung Conference had been a crucial site
for the Indonesian government to claim its territorial rights to West Papua and
control the narrative of their re-colonisation of the region to Afro-Asian allied
nations.36 A foundational event for the emergence of the Afro-Asian movement,
Bandung formalised transnational solidarity between post-colonial nations across
the global south and marked the formal emergence of Third Worldism within
international diplomacy. Although Indonesia struggled to recruit unilateral
Afro-Asian support for their West Papua plan,37 the ties of Afro-Asian solidarity
still provided the majority votes for the construction of UNTEA within the
General Assembly.38 Thus, the West Papua vote demonstrated that nations align-
ing with the anti-colonial movement, in practice, supported anti-European colo-
nialism rather than explicitly opposing all imperialism or authoritarianism.
Political histories on the Papuan independence movement have provided
detailed investigations into the violation of Papuan rights and the campaigns of
racism against the Papuan population.39 Tracey Banivanua-Mar and Emma Kluge
focused on these indigenous campaigns and situated activists’ rhetoric within inter-
national anti-colonial and Pan-African movements within the global south.40
Indonesian and western politicians, such as John F Kennedy, perpetuated a bestial
image of a tribes populated by ‘stone-age’, evolutionarily stunted and cannibalistic
peoples, in order to dismiss the Papuans’ demands for independence.41 Kluge, in
particular, has emphasised how the West Papuan activists’ used race rhetoric and
imperial categorisations of themselves to assert their racial difference from
Indonesia, as a means of achieving independence.42 Similarly, David Webster
34 For more on the impact of Bandung on the Afro-Asian movement and international diplomacy,
see: A. Phillips, ‘Beyond Bandung: the 1955 Asian-African Conference and its legacies for international
order’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 70, 4 (2016); C. Ewing, ‘The Colombo Powers:
crafting diplomacy in the Third World and launching Afro-Asia at Bandung’, Cold War History, 19,
1 (2019), 1–19.
35 Kuitenbrouwer, ‘Beyond the “Trauma of Decolonisation”’, 310/11.
36 Q. Swan, ‘Blinded by Bandung?: Illumining West Papua, Senegal, and the Black Pacific’, Radical
History Review, Vol. 2018: 131.
37 For more on the Brazzaville vote, see Kluge, p. 10; Kuitenbrouwer, ‘Beyond the ‘Trauma of
Decolonisation’’, 319/20.
38 The resolution affirming the New York Agreement was adopted by 89 votes to none, with 14
abstentions: UN Doc, A/PV.1127, ‘General Assembly 17th Session’, 21 September 1962, 52/3.
39 A. Muhammed, ‘The historical origins of secessionist movement in West Papua’, Journal of Asia
Pacific Studies, 3, 1 (2013), 1–13; P. Savage and R. Martin, ‘The OPM in West Papua New Guinea: the
continuing struggle against Indonesian colonialism’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 7, 3 (1977), 338–46.
40 Banivanua-Mar, Decolonisation and the Pacific; E. Kluge, ‘West Papua and the international his-
tory of decolonization, 1961–69’, International History Review, 42, 6 (2019), 1155–72.
41 Banivanua-Mar, ‘A thousand miles of cannibal lands’, 584; Swan, ‘Blinded by Bandung’, 60.
42 Kluge, ‘West Papua’, 9.
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has demonstrated that Dutch arguments of racial difference between the ‘dark-
skinned’ West Papuans and the ‘Asian’ Indonesians were foundational in the
protracted battle over the territory.43 During the 1950s, the Indonesian govern-
ment publicly challenged this and argued that there were multiple different ethnic
groups on the island, rather than one ‘West Papuan race’, as this argument under-
mined their claim to the territory and pursuit of authority across the archipelago.44
However, following the New York Agreement, the Indonesian government pur-
sued an active policy of genocide and military aggression against the Papuan
population, much of it driven by racial exceptionalism and a desire for authori-
tarian control.45
Articulating the racialised prejudices at the heart of the UN peacekeeping cul-
ture requires a critical approach to the racist underpinnings of international rela-
tions and, more specifically, the UN leadership’s strategy for protecting
international peace and security during the Cold War.46 Scholarship on racism
within international relations has been traditionally limited by the assumption that
the ‘elite Western subject’ was the ‘implicit cosmopolitan subject’ and central
‘agent in the task of global justice’,47 but critical research has begun to examine
the racial power dynamics, inequalities and hierarchies perpetuated through liberal
international institutions, organisations and networks.48 Scholars such as Robert
Vitalis, Errol Henderson, Ines Valdez and Victor Ray have highlighted how inter-
national organisations, like the UN, behaved as racial structures despite projecting
themselves – and being projected through traditional scholarship – as technocratic,
race-neutral bureaucracies.49 Ray, in particular, has emphasised that it is not the
‘individual prejudice and racial animus’ that is now being drawn to attention by
this critical work, but the result of racialised logic combined with ‘organisational
processes’ such as gatekeeping, exclusion, or knowledge production.50 It is not the
existence of international staff’s racism that deserves our attention. Instead, we
should focus on the organisational mechanisms and interests which not only
43 D. Webster, ‘“Already Sovereign as a People”: a foundational moment in West Papuan national-
ism’, Pacific Affairs, 74, 4 (2001), 512–3.
44 Webster, ‘”Already Sovereign as a People”’, 512.
45 J. Elmslie and C. Webb-Gannon, ‘A slow-motion genocide: Indonesian rule in West Papua’,
Griffith Journal of Law and Human Dignity, 1, 2 (2013), 156.
46 For more on the racial underpinnings of the international relations system, specifically the demo-
cratic peace theses, see: E.A. Henderson, ‘Navigating the muddy waters of the mainstream: tracing the
mystification of racism in international relations’, in W.C. Rich (ed.) African American Perspectives on
Political Science (Philadelphia, PA 2007).
47 I. Valdez, ‘Association, reciprocity, and emancipation: a transnational account of the politics of
global justice’, in D. Bell (ed.) Empire, race and global justice (Cambridge 2019), 121–122.
48 B.G. Jones, ‘Race in the ontology of international order’, Political Studies, 56, 4 (2008), 907–27; W.
E. Connolly, ‘The liberal image of the nation’, in D. Ivison, et al. (eds) Political Theory and the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (Cambridge 2000).
49 R. Vitalis,White World Order, Black Power Politics (Ithaca, NY 2015); E.A. Henderson, ‘Hidden in
plain sight: racism in international relations theory’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26, 1
(2016), 71–92; Valdez, ‘Association, reciprocity, and emancipation’; V. Ray, ‘A theory of racialized
organizations’, American Sociological Review, 84, 1 (2019), 26–53.
50 Ray, ‘A theory of racialised organisations’, 27.
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conceal but support the translation of staff’s racist logic into operational decision-
making, geopolitical structures and inequal rules of engagement within the
international order. This article builds upon this literature and demonstrates the
presence of racism within the UN peacekeeping missions, tracing how internation-
al personnel reallocated patterns of authority and suppressed local activists in
order to maintain stability on the ground and preserve nation-state hierarchies
within the international order.
This article first examines the logic of UNTEA staff underpinning their gate-
keeping strategy and preventing the Papuan population from amplifying their
cause. Through a close examination of the communication and reports written
by UNTEA personnel during the first phase of the mission, it reveals the role
that racialised conceptions of the Papuans played in informing peacekeeping
decision-making and practices. It pays particular attention to how the UNTEA
staff interacted with the host population and communicated Papuan activities to
those within the rest of the mission bureaucracy. The next section focuses on
highlighting gatekeeping practices by mission staff and concentrates on UNTEA
leadership’s violation of Papuan civil rights as a tactic to safeguard stability in the
territory. Finally, the article examines the consequences of the mission’s gatekeep-
ing logic and practices by illustrating the ongoing violence and oppression against
Papuan anti-Indonesian activists.
The New York Agreement attempted to disengage the UN staff from Papuan self-
determination during the organisation’s administration of the territory by delaying
the question until after Indonesia assumed authority.51 However, the bureaucrats
of the mission, especially the Administrator Abdoh, utilised the Divisional
Commissioners’ interactions with the population to survey and remain updated
on the political lives within the territory. Thant chose Dr Djalal Abdoh, an Iranian
politician with close ties to the Afro-Asian movement,52 to represent the organi-
sation in West Papua.53 He was appointed to the mission until the agreed date of
transition to Indonesian sovereignty on 1 May 1963.54 Meeting Thant in 1955 at
the Bandung Conference as Head of the Iranian delegation gave Abdoh the oppor-
tunity to amplify himself as a vocal delegate within the Afro-Asian bloc.55 Abdoh
originally established himself within international diplomatic networks in spring
1945 as the Iranian Representative at the UN during the San Francisco
Conference. By 1952, he was enmeshed in General Assembly debates about
51 United Nations, ‘New York Agreement’, Article X. Available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/
peacemaker.un.org/files/ID%20NL_620815_AgreementConcerningWestNewGuinea.pdf (accessed on 6
December 2018).
52 R. Burke, ‘“The compelling dialogue of freedom”: human rights at the Bandung conference’,
Human Rights Quarterly, 28, 4 (2006), 956.
53 UNARMS, S-0876-0001-07-00001, ‘Press release: acting secretary-general appoints administrator
of West New Guinea (West Irian)’, 22 October 1962.
54 UNARMS, S-0876-0001-07-00001, ‘Press release WNG/55: United Nations administrator arrives
in West New Guinea’, 14 November 1962.
55 R. Burke, Decolonisation and the Evolution of International Human Rights (Philadelphia, PA
2011), 45.
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sovereignty and natural resources, arguing that nation-states should be able to
protect their oil from multinational corporations and retain the wealth.
Marrying anti-colonial politics to extraction economics, Abdoh spent the 1950s
defending the importance of ‘permanent sovereignty’ and the nation-state system
of the UN as integral to fighting global inequality.56 Thus, his diplomatic speeches
suggest that Abdoh perceived the protection of nation-state sovereignty within the
UN as central to the anti-colonial fight against extractive imperialism.
Subsequent field-based positions, such as Plebiscite Commissioner for the UN-
organised referendum in Cameroon, helped Abdoh build a reputation as an expert
in ‘reconciling opposing factions’ in complicated colonial disputes.57 His experi-
ence within the UN systems in addition to his shared politics of the ‘spirit of
Bandung’ made him a reliable colleague who Thant could trust to protect the
institution’s reputation in West Papua.58 Deployment to West Papua provided
Abdoh with a novel mandate to direct the administration as he saw fit for the
future wellbeing of the territory and region with few accountability measures other
than limited communications with UN headquarters. Rather than disengaging
from the question of Papuan self-determination, Abdoh promoted the internation-
al staff’s racialised assessments and generalising statements, thus legitimising the
continued dismissal of Papuan rights to the international community.
The communications between the divisional commissioners and the mission
headquarters reveal a widespread racist policy towards the Papuans, formalised
as accurate assessment of the host community. The role of the six UN divisional
commissioners was a dual role of knowledge production and reproduction between
the UNTEA mission base and the Papuan communities. They performed primarily
as eyes on the ground for the mission leadership, tasked with recording regional
activities and distributing relevant information to West Papuan groups.59
However, many of the mission directors and divisional commissioners were ‘per-
sons who have served in colonial territories for a considerable part of their
career’.60 Their past experiences as colonial administrators and governors distorted
their analysis of the Papuan population and influenced the accuracy of their
accounts. For example, Gordon S. Carter, divisional commissioner for the
Central Highlands, informed in his November situational update that he was
struggling to, ‘guide the faltering steps of stone-age man along the dimly lit
paths of progress and enlightenment . . . the obligation is of course a moral one
towards some 200–300,000 extremely primitive peoples . . . many of whom are still
56 C.R.W. Dietrich, Oil Revolution: Anticolonial Elites, Sovereign Rights, and the Economic Culture of
Decolonization (Cambridge 2017), 28–41.
57 UNARMS, S-0876-0001-07-00001, ‘Dr Djalal Abdoh newspaper cuttings’, 4.
58 L. Eslava, M. Fakhri and V. Nesiah, ‘The spirit of Bandung’, in L. Eslava, M. Fakhri and V.
Nesiah (eds) Bandung, Global History, and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures
(Cambridge 2017), 3–32.
59 The six regions with Divisional Commissioners were Hollandia/Kotabaru, Central Highlands, Fak
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in the stone-age state of primitive savagery and tribal warfare’.61 This imperialistic
rhetoric was frequently woven into district commissioner’s analysis of the popu-
lation in the pretence that their judgement of the society was apolitical and from a
place of technocratic expertise. Abdoh briefly communicated his concerns about
his colleagues’ colonial experience and racial prejudices to Thant, having received
their ‘observations and ideas’ in their weekly updates.62 Nevertheless, Abdoh con-
tinued to include and, indeed, foreground divisional commissioners’ racialised
commentary in his reports, ensuring that their interpretations of the Papuan pop-
ulation were presented uncritically and as fact. Although Abdoh did not compose
these regional updates himself, it was his decision to include these dismissive pater-
nalistic and racialised comments in his reports to the secretary-general and present
them as accurate generalisations of the Papuan population. Thus, the UNTEA
bureaucrats legitimised the Dutch characterisation of the Papuans as a ‘primitive’
population, not yet ready for self-determination and disconnected as a nation.
On 1 December 1962, Abdoh instructed his divisional commissioners in a con-
fidential memorandum to make ‘discreet enquiries’ with the Papuans in their
region on their general mood towards self-determination,63 intending to gauge
the reception to a speedier Indonesian take-over.64 He used their responses, as
well as previous communication, including weekly updates, police reports and
telegrams, to produce an extensive report for the UN headquarters. Once sent at
the end of the mission’s first phase on 31 December, this report provided the
secretary-general and the Secretariat inner circle, such as Chef de Cabinet
Chakravarthi V Narasimhan, vital insight into the political situation on the
ground and the receptibility of the population to the Indonesian takeover. The
UN officials were geographically and politically disconnected from the West
Papuan territorial authority, forcing them to rely on the UNTEA leadership’s
assessment and judgement in driving their diplomatic approach to the transfer.
The UNTEA bureaucrats’ opinions of the mission mandate and political life on
the island informed the organisation’s strategy towards Indonesian diplomats and,
more broadly, shaped international delegates’ understanding of the host popula-
tion and territory.65 Therefore, the mid-level peacekeeping bureaucrats provided a
unique service in international knowledge production as the ‘frontline’ experts to
the region.
In structuring his long report to Thant throughout the first phase of the mission,
from October to December 1962, Abdoh introduced the three main strata of the
Papuan population and, in turn, dismissed their political positions as unrepresen-
tative and evidence of underdevelopment: elite, urban and rural communities. He
61 Bodleian Library, Special Collections United Nations Career Records Project, D. Burnell Vickers,
‘Central Highlands, Situation Report, 7th November 1962’, Sections 53–60, pp. 1–2, 8.
62 Ibid., p. 40.
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65 UNARMS, S-0876-0001-07-00001, ‘Abdoh report to Thant’, 13 December 1962, p. 30.
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labelled any Papuan political engagement as illegitimate due to its unreliability or
unrepresentative nature in order to justify the mission’s decision not to publicise
the treatment of activists on the island and push for the plebiscite under UN
jurisdiction. However, as contemporary works by Dutch scholars van der Kroef
and van der Veur observed in the early 1960s, Papuan activist movements had
developed across the territory throughout the 1950s and the formation of several
regional political parties demonstrated the vibrancy of youthful and rural Papuan
nationalist engagement.66
Abdoh criticised elite Papuans and focused on the group’s dominant character-
istics as selfish and easily bought: ‘Irrespective of their real feelings, they try to be
on the right side of the Indonesians and thereby secure their future. No wonder
that they should be prone to follow whatever lead comes from Indonesia and
thereby remain in the forefront of public life.67 Thus, Abdoh generalised all elite
Papuans as a group that should be totally disregarded in the UNTEA decision-
making process, noting that their opinions were likely to be unquestioningly pro-
Indonesian and meaningless. This disregard of the Papuan leadership and elite
strata was also reproduced by other international actors. The British Foreign
Office commented that, ‘The various leaders of opinion . . . had now virtually all
gone over to the Indonesians with whom their bread would in future be but-
tered’.68 However, scholarship on West Papuan nationalism has demonstrated
the diversity of elite Papuan political feeling during UNTEA, contrary to
Abdoh’s report, revealing how Papuan opinions were not homogenous or
static.69 By asserting that all Papuan elite leaders were pro-Indonesian, he erased
the dynamic, complex political debates emerging from Papuan consultative spaces
and communities as activists navigated their nation’s future during UNTEA.70
Abdoh’s conviction that all Papuan leaders were ‘mostly motivated by their own
narrow self-interest rather than a genuine interest in a public cause’ demonstrated
a disregard for the diversity of opinion within the Papuan elite class and contempt
for the population he was employed to protect.71 Abdoh also ignored UNTEA’s
complicity in creating an environment increasingly dominated by Indonesian sol-
diers, politicians, and administrators, many of whom were absorbed within the
mission itself.72 To be sure, some Papuan elites, including World War Two military
‘heroes’ Marthen Indey, Lukas Rumkorem and Silas Papare, accepted the fait
66 J.M. van der Kroef, ‘Nationalism and politics in West New Guinea’, Pacific Affairs, 34, 1 (1961),
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accompli of incoming Indonesian rule and supported the Indonesian unity project.73
Sections of Papuan elites used this transitional period to build goodwill with
Indonesian politicians in order to maintain power through the changeover.74 As
the divisional commissioner of Merauke wrote in an update to Abdoh, ‘Already
pressure from paratroopers on local residents has made some Papuans feel it
would be good for the future health to favour Indonesia now’.75 However, several
Papuan leaders and important figures, such as Nicolaas Jouwe, Marcus Kaisiepo and
Filiman Jufuway,76 adopted vocal anti-Indonesian positions and were integral to
attempts at promoting the population’s right to self-determination to the internation-
al community.77 Therefore, Abdoh’s prejudice against Papuan self-determination
manifested in his generalisation of the population’s elite class despite evidence that
this group held multiple political positions, including demanding self-determination.
Next, Abdoh dismissed the political activities and activism of urban Papuan
communities, arguing that they were numerically insignificant. He suggested that
their activism had been engineered by groups outside the territory, as he believed it
unfeasible for Papuans to demonstrate such political imagination.78 Writing to
Thant, Abdoh emphasised how unrepresentative the urban activists were within
the vast territory, especially protests in Hollandia. Anti-Indonesia demonstrations
in the capital city took place before and during the UNTEA mission, disrupting
Abdoh’s characterisation of a population predominantly in favour of annexation.
He argued that ‘The normal media through which public opinion expresses itself
are non-existent. Communications are incredibly poor; large areas are still inac-
cessible and lie outside the administrative control. The combined effect of all this is
to make it a well-nigh impossible task’.79 Abdoh noted that the absence of a
territory-wide communications network made the construction of a unified nation-
alist movement impossible and took the pockets of anti-Indonesian groups across
the country as evidence of an isolated population of which it is impossible to gauge
the opinion, rather than an indication of a widespread movement limited by poor
infrastructure. Thus, Abdoh, chose to disregard the efforts of groups such as the
Biak-Numfoor Regional Council and their interactions with their divisional com-
missioner.80 Abdoh continued to view the political agency of the Papuan popula-
tion negatively against his discretionary standard of formal enfranchisement.
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Finally, Abdoh argued that the majority of the rural Papuan population could
not provide a public opinion ‘even in a rudimentary form’.81 He characterised the
rural class as, ‘politically inarticulate and [. . .] nothing to do with social life or
political changes taking place in this territory’; their lifestyle supposedly justifying
their exclusion from the political future of their territory.82 He explained that the
rural population’s political opinion was, supposedly, so ‘inarticulate’ that the mis-
sion leadership was abdicated from any suggestion of holding a plebiscite during
UNTEA.83 Allegedly, most of the population was intellectually incapable of
understanding alternative scenarios for the future direction of the territory, nor
able to find a basis for choosing between, and, therefore, it was legitimate that
diplomats in New York had made the decision for them, without meaningful
consultation. By infantilising the population, despite his knowledge of widespread
political agency across the territory, Abdoh reconfirmed the Dutch’s paternalistic
governance and legitimised the removal of self-determination from the population.
He relinquished the mission staff from acting in accordance with the organisation’s
responsibilities to colonial peoples, normatively rooted in the principles of the UN
Charter and the 1960 General Assembly resolution, thus, demonstrating the dis-
connect between the rhetoric of the UN headquarters and the practices in the field
in decolonising contexts.84
This stratified manner of dismissing each socio-economic group of Papuan
society was a central source of frustration for the anti-Indonesian Papuan com-
munities. These communities felt that the elite group’s pro-Indonesian opinions
were publicised in the international media as the only political view in the entire
population.85 David Sommerville, Director of Internal Affairs for UNTEA,
reported to Abdoh in December 1962 that, ‘There is also a considerable amount
of dissatisfaction with self-styled leaders who proceed to Indonesia as sign of
assent to declarations on behalf of constituents whom they have never consulted’.86
The privilege, therefore, of the affluent Papuan elite was that their resignation to
the Indonesian takeover, to seek goodwill with the incoming Indonesian politi-
cians, served to legitimise the imminent transition and project that the entire pop-
ulation consented to the Indonesian take-over. Without the support of the
UNTEA staff, the Papuan activists had no methods of recourse and were, thus,
unable to challenge the characterisation of the entire population in support – or
uninterested – in the transfer to Indonesian administration. Any engagement with
the petitions or claims made by the Papuan population, and their efforts to
81 Ibid., p. 30.
82 Ibid., p. 30.
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internationalise their situation, were dismissed as anomalies to the general political
apathy of the population and, thus, acceptable for the UN staff to ignore.87
Abdoh’s racialised assumptions of unrepresentative political literacy and ‘prim-
itivism’ within the Papuan population demonstrates how anti-colonial leaders were
susceptible to their own discretionary standards of rights within international soci-
ety. Conceptions of colonised populations were not developed within a vacuum.
Anti-colonialism was a heterogenous movement, linking different actors from dif-
ferent backgrounds who suggested different solutions to different disputes.88 ‘Self-
determination’ was without normative definition and this affected how the term
could be deployed and who by; if ‘self-determination’ was diversely understood, it
could be co-opted by non-egalitarian or colonial actors for their own interests
rather than seeking the amplification of vulnerable or silenced groups.89 Anti-
colonial activists in positions of power, like Abdoh, held significant authority to
decide whether a population ‘deserved’ self-determination which affected the lens
through which the population was viewed. Abdoh pursued an arbitrary and highly
personal standard required for a population to be sufficiently ‘deserving’ of self-
determination, thus, encouraging a pattern of unequal access to UN support and,
necessarily, leading to rights violations. There existed a tension between Abdoh’s
anti-colonial credentials from his work as Iranian Representative at Bandung and
his perception of the role of UNTEA administrator. in principle he championed
the right to self-determination but, in practice, his racialised perception of which
movements should be afforded that right led to his consent to the re-colonisation
of the territory.90
Paradoxically, in attempting to disparage the ‘politically inarticulate’ popula-
tion, too complex to comprehend as a unified nationalist movement, Abdoh
acknowledged the politically vibrant environment in West Papua, particularly
emanating from anti-Indonesian circles. Thus, this report revealed the UNTEA
staff’s early knowledge of widespread Papuan pro-independence activists and
groups. However, rather than correcting the racialised characterisation of the pop-
ulation and rectify the foundational assumptions of the New York Agreement, the
mission leadership chose to continue dismissing the Papuan activists despite their
knowledge of pro-independence political activity in the territory. UNTEA staff,
thus, obscured the political agency of the population and dehumanised the
Papuans in their internal communications as a means of justifying the UN’s instru-
mental role in negotiating the New York Agreement and the mission’s inherent
support of the Indonesian take-over. This section illustrated how peacekeeping
missions provided fertile conditions paternalism to thrive within ranks of post-
war humanitarian bureaucracy. This paternalistic power dynamic guided the
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decision-making of peacekeeping staff as they placed themselves developmentally
superior to the population and thus legitimately ‘knowing what was best’ for the
Papuans.
During the second phase of the mission, beginning on 31 December 1962, the fragile
peace established during the first phase had begun to crumble as Papuan activists
gleaned that the UNTEA mission staff would be unwilling to promote their right to
self-determination before the Indonesian take-over.91 These gatekeeping practices
were driven by institutional concerns about their reputational capability to retain
stability in their field operations and their own rationale of the political context; it
would do the population more harm to fight the inevitable. The mission sought to
pacify the activist sections of the Papuan population in order to conceal the UNTEA
administration’s unwillingness to challenge the Agreement and to avert protests
within mission territory and the wider Pacific area. The divisional commissioner
from Biak, a particularly politically active region, suggested the mission needed
to, ‘let [the Papuans] down gently if they are not to explode’.92 He argued that
international staff should prepare a swift exit from the island, perhaps even before
the official end date, warning, ‘That there will ultimately be quite serious resistance
to the Indonesians is, I think, certain . . . it behoves the UNTEA to depart as soon as
the Indonesians are thick enough on the ground . . .’.93
However, the mission staff’s efforts to maintain stability were threatened by
Indonesian propaganda and coercion efforts, spreading anxiety within the peace-
keeping bureaucracy that the successful completion of the mission was at risk. For
the mission to help repair the organisation’s operational reputation, the mission
leadership needed to maintain authority of West Papua and demonstrate admin-
istrative power despite ongoing obstructionism. From 1 January 1963, there began
a significant influx of Indonesian soldiers into West Papua, many of whom were
described by the Biak divisional commissioner as, ‘younger people whose educa-
tional training appears to have been more political than practical’.94 The
Indonesian government’s obstructionism was focused on shortening the length
of the mission through the proxy of coercible or influenceable Papuans. Once
deployed to the territory, new Indonesian troops sought to harness and assert
their power as the incoming sovereign authority power. These troops cultivated
pro-Indonesian groups of Papuans, many of whom were coerced or misinformed,95
to send petitions demanding a shortening of the mission’s duration.96 The Biak
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district commissioner reported that his local representatives had communicated to
him that at least one instance of a Papuan pro-Indonesian petition had ‘fallen into
Indonesian hands’.97 Abdoh also noted in a report to Thant that he had, ‘reason to
believe that this method [of coercion] is widely practiced in Hollandia and other
divisions by self-styled leaders’.98 Coerced petitions attempted to characterise the
majority of the Papuan population as being in support of the Indonesian take-over
and, although UNTEA leadership were suspicious of genuine Papuan feelings,
they were concerned that the presence of obstructive Indonesian troops could
disturb the fragile peace of the territory and neighbouring islands.
Even before the second phase of the mission had begun, rumours travelled to
the UNTEA bureaucracy that any pro-independence rallies or self-determination
protests would become violent due to appearances from pro-Indonesian groups.99
Abdoh wrote in his progress report to Thant that, ‘There is also the risk that the
Indonesian who are already in this Territory, might encourage, or engineer, inci-
dents involving Indonesian troops in order to achieve their objectives’.100 Within a
month of this report, on 17 January 1963, the UN Department of Information
broadcast reports of a pro-Indonesian, ‘spontaneous mass demonstration which
had apparently been staged by some 2,000 West Irianese [Papuans] before the
UNTEA office at Kotabaru [Hollandia]’.101 Indonesian efforts to motivate sup-
port within West Papuan communities and propaganda tactics put people on the
street, whether they were coerced or not, and the threat of violent clashes between
Papuan political groups and Indonesian paratroopers became a source of serious
concern for the UNTEA administration as they worried about the diplomatic
implications of violent eruptions under their authority. Although Abdoh had
made efforts to enquire about the possibility of shortening the length of the mis-
sion, in acquiescence to Indonesian demands, Thant did not want to capitulate; the
organisation could not run the reputational risk of being antagonised to leave
early, unable to do its job, with their tail between their legs.
Instead, the mission leadership used the threats of political clashes and violence
to its advantage. Rather than attempting to challenge the root of the threat and
investigate the accusations of the Indonesian government’s coercion and misinfor-
mation campaign, the UNTEA officials securitised the question of West Papuans’
self-determination and reasserted their role as the arbiter of law and order in the
territory by policing and limiting civil rights. The district commissioner from Biak
acknowledged the predicament of maintaining the terms of the New York
Agreement following deployment and administration of the territory: ‘The
simple issue is whether largely fabricated evidence [of majority pro-Indonesian
feeling] is to be discounted and a bona fide attempt made in time by the UN to
ascertain Papuan feeling, with the assurance convincingly given in advance that if
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the vote goes in favour of Papuan separation from Indonesia it can and will be
effectively supported’.102 Publicly accepting that the population supported the
Indonesian take-over benefitted the UN narrative; they could argue that the UN
masterminded a popular political decision rather than championed an artificial
one, rooted in racism.
In response to this potential risk, the UNTEA leadership securitised Papuan
pro-independence political meetings and demonstrations as a means of preventing
all potential breaches to the peace or instability. The UNTEA leadership installed
a policy of authoritarianism by bureaucracy. They complicated existing protocols
and expanded documentary requirements for public assemblies and meetings,
expanding the terms of an old colonial law stating that activists must seek permis-
sion from their regional official before lawfully organising public processions and
meetings.103 On 18 February, the UNTEA mission published a new decree
instructing all activists that ‘the request for such permission must be filed with
the Divisional Commission or District Officer at least 48 hours before the sched-
uled time for such processions, public entertainment or celebration’.104 Failure to
do so would result in a fine and, potentially, up to two weeks imprisonment,
demonstrating the mission staff’s willingness to utilise the carceral system to pro-
tect the stability of the mission.105 The divisional commissioner would then be
given the final right of veto ‘in the event that a proposed procession would be
likely to cause a breach of the peace’, further empowering the commissioners to
interfere in the political life of West Papuans.106
This expanded decree also asserted that the UNTEA commissioners retained a
discretionary right to refuse any application if they were under any concern of
potential ‘incidents’ erupting, further imbuing the peacekeeping officials with arbi-
trary decision-making powers.107 The decree stated that the ‘overriding duty of
Divisional Commissioners [is] the maintenance of law and order’, thus encouraging
the commissioners to prioritise an overly cautious approach to approving assembly
requests, especially in the context of intensified Indonesian obstruction efforts
across the territory.108 UNTEA officials held control over the access, topics and
very existence of public political meetings organised by Papuan residents. The
divisional commissioners, now armed with 48 hours to take any necessary law
and order measures in response to activists’ requests, were also authorised by
the existing permissions of the old Dutch law which permitted ‘civil servants and
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police officers’ to attend ‘all meetings’.109 Additionally, this law outlined that ‘said
civil servants and police shall have the right to force and entry in cases where
admission is refused to them, under the auspices of the district officer’ and ‘admis-
sion may be refused to other persons’, sanctioning the UNTEA officials with
immense gatekeeping authority over all political activity in the territory.110
Thus, by mid-February the new and expanded West Papuan laws had established
a precedent of authoritarianism, especially towards pro-independence activists,
that would only be intensified once annexed by Indonesia.
During the second phase of the mission, a significant number of Indonesian
personnel joined the UNTEA administration and police service, drastically altering
the national proportion of the mission and expanding the official Indonesian pres-
ence in West Papua.111 In an environment of acknowledged coercion, the mission
law and order policy forced pro-independence activists to discuss their plans and
demands in the presence of armed Indonesian police officers and officials – that is,
if their request for assembly was approved. Therefore, the UNTEA leadership
prioritised the stability of the region in every aspect of the mission’s operations,
encouraging the overt violation of Papuan civil liberties under UN authority.
Behaving like a colonial state, the UNTEA staff used their own fears of instability,
violence, or ‘emergency’ in order to expand their own security permissions and to
maintain absolute control over the territory.112
The mission also served to stymy Papuan efforts to internationalise their claims
within the international humanitarian sphere. Attracting the attention of other
international humanitarian organisations in the few months left before the
Indonesian take-over was the Papuan activists’ best strategy to pressure the
UNTEA mission to hold the plebiscite under UN jurisdiction. In January 1963,
three Papuan leaders from the New Guinea Council, based in Hollandia – Jouwe,
Kaisiepo, and Jufuway – appealed to the President of the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva, Leopold Boissier.113 They met and organised
with fellow anti-Indonesian activists in The Hague as they drafted the statement,
recognising the UNTEA period was an unprecedented legal opportunity for the
territory to resist re-colonisation. The Councillors wrote the letter to report mul-
tiple incidents of Indonesian violence against nationalist Papuans during the
period of UNTEA administration and gave details such as dates and injured
parties.114 They also stated that these incidents had been reported to them by
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‘various sides’ so as to position themselves as impartial actors.115 The Council
leaders requested the ICRC to send an independent investigation and query the
plans to transfer administration into Indonesian hands on humanitarian and
human rights grounds, attaching a supportive statement by UNTEA physician
R. Kummer to their letter.116 Kummer signed this statement from Zeist, a town
in the Netherlands, verifying the injuries cited in the letter and referring to his
period as a medic in the Central Hospital in Hollandia while employed by
UNTEA.117 He confirmed that he treated two patients on 1 January 1963 who
had been seriously injured, likely whipped and beaten, by Indonesian paratroopers
the previous afternoon in Ifar, a town westwards from Hollandia.118 His witness
statement and position of legitimacy as a physician employed by the UN was
utilised as evidence by the New Guinea Councilmembers of the violence and
human rights abuses prevalent, and likely to intensify following Indonesian annex-
ation, in West Papua.119 The Councillors hoped they could escalate their claims by
opening a line of communication directly between an anti-Indonesian activist
group and an international humanitarian organisation.
However, the Papuan Councillors underestimated the informal allegiances
within the elites of international society. A week after receiving the petition,
Roger Gallopin, the Executive Director of the ICRC, sent a letter to the
Director General of the UN in Geneva, Pier Spinelli to alert him to the accusations
made by the activists.120 Gallopin suggested that Abdoh as the Administrator
appointed by Thant, ‘would be better than anyone able to rule on the merits of
the complaints we received. . .’.121 He also argued that the UNTEA Administrator
would be in the best position to take action to prevent violence, ‘if they [the abuses]
have actually taken place’, indicating that the ICRC leadership found it hard to
believe the accounts of such violence under UN authority.122 Returning the power
of oversight to the UN, the ICRC’s assumption of a UN senior official’s indepen-
dence and their preference to not interfere with the UN’s area of jurisdiction served
to prevent the Papuan activists from accessing international humanitarian
recourse. Following confidential communication between the UN Secretariat
office in New York and the ICRC headquarters in Geneva, the Papuan
Councillors received a short letter from an ICRC delegate – rather than
Gallopin – stating that the organisation had been informed that any previous
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instances of violence between Indonesian officials and Papuan civilians were
‘exceptional’ and that efforts had been made by the UNTEA mission to avoid ‘a
repetition’ of ‘any disagreement or tension’.123 Thus, fellow humanitarian organ-
isations contributed to the delegitimisation of reported instances of serious vio-
lence by favouring a narrative of exaggerative Papuans over one of inattentive
peacekeepers.
International perceptions of the UN’s principles and therefore assumptions of
the mission’s inherent benevolence also prevented Papuans from seeking political
asylum in neighbouring nations. Some of those who lost hope in UNTEA
attempted to migrate across the border into Australian-mandated Papua New
Guinea before the Indonesian takeover on 1 May 1963.124 Scholarship on the
Australian government response to asylum claims by Klaus Neumann and
Savitri Taylor has shown the Australian government’s policy of appeasement
towards its ‘powerful northern neighbour, Indonesia’, situating this decision as
part of a longer trend of xenophobic foreign policy in the country.125 Australia’s
decision to reject Papuan asylum claims in 1963 was also underpinned by the
government’s assumption of the conditions under an UN authority. The
Australian government argued that a legitimate basis for political asylum could
not be made from civilians leaving a UN administrated territory. They argued that
UNTEA officials should be the sole responsibility for managing these claims of
asylum rather than any other national government, ‘bearing in mind the human-
itarian principles to which the United Nations subscribe’.126 Thus, Papuan acti-
vists’ efforts to communicate their experiences and concerns for the future were
thwarted, directly and indirectly by UNTEA’s administration of the territory.
Under un-elected UN governance, the population had no recourse to popularise
or protest their predicament to the international community, nor to seek legal
protection abroad. For the international community, the mission was assumed
to be the canary in the mine; if the UN staff became suspicious of the rights
protections in the territory, they would sound the alarm and react accordingly.
As the second phase of the mission progressed, the dynamic in the territory shifted
and the reality of the impending take-over began to have brutal consequences. The
consequences of UNTEA’s delegitimisation campaign became unavoidably evident
in the physical repercussions on the Papuan population. The UNTEA staff dis-
missed the Papuans’ political fears and reports of Indonesian paratroopers’ aggres-
sion, rationalising that the future treatment of the population was out of their
hands and beyond their control. The same racist logic underpinning the UNTEA
123 ICRC Archives, B AG 200 158-002 200 (96), ‘Letter from ICRC Delgate to Mr. N. Jouwe’, 11
March 1963.
124 UNARMS, S-0703-0001-02, ‘Memorandum on some points of interest regarding West New
Guinea – from Abdoh’s visit to the Netherlands’, p. 3.
125 K. Neumann and S. Taylor, ‘Australia, Indonesia, and West Papuan refugees, 1962–2009’,
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 10, 1 (2010), 3.
126 UNARMS, S-0703-0001-02, ‘Memorandum on some points of interest regarding West New
Guinea - from Abdoh’s visit to the Netherlands’, p. 3.
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bureaucracy’s political delegitimisation of the population also encouraged the
same leadership to characterise the population as troublemakers without motive
and therefore likely to exaggerate or fabricate incidents of abuse.127
The close relationship between the UNTEA leadership and the West Papua
police chief inspired a policy of diminishment or outright dismissal of Papuan
reports of abuse. British national, Police Chief, J C. Robertson lead the policing
wing of the UNTEA mission sent daily intelligence reports to the UNTEA head-
quarters to alert them of any security issues. During the second phase of the mis-
sion, the police recorded repeated instances of informal policing and violence
against pro-Independence Papuans by Indonesians during this period.128 For
instance, on one occasion 53 pro-independence Papuans were unlawfully arrested
and detained for several days by Indonesian troops for damaging the Indonesian
flag.129 The police discovered these detainees in their cells on 4 January and judged
the arrest illegal, immediately releasing the civilians.130 However, in internal com-
munications, police chief Robertson blamed the victims for their own illegal arrest
and attributed the incident to the detained Papuans’ ‘alcoholic intake’.131
Robertson’s assessment of this incident was part of a wider trend of dismissal
and diminishment of the Papuan situation in order to normalise the mission
staff’s inaction.
In another instance, the mission leadership also revealed that it had been made
aware of members of the Indonesian Army Intelligence agency tracking down and
counteracting pro-independence Papuans across the territory during this period
through updates from divisional commissioners. In one of Abdoh’s progress
reports to the UN headquarters, he mentioned that the Indonesian Army
Intelligence had been actively scanning the island’s communications for anti-
Indonesian groups and petitions in order to put pressure on Papuan civilians in
retaliation for their activism.132 The police and UNTEA leadership preferred to
individualise the situations rather than examine the compounding impact of all
reported instances.133 Thus, the UNTEA leaders disregarded the political and
societal implications of these police reports and remained indifferent to the
growth in Papuan unease and vulnerability following the influx of Indonesians
to the territory.
After transferring authority to the Indonesian government on 31 May 1963, the
UN leadership reflected on the UNTEA mission as a success and a peaceful res-
olution to a potentially disastrous territorial dispute.134 The mission bureaucracy
fulfilled the mission mandate and the terms of the New York Agreement.
127 UNARMS, S-0682-0003-01, ‘Illegal arrests by Indonesian troops, 7.1.63’.
128 UNARMS, S-0682-0003-01, ‘Daily intelligence: Police Headquarters, 17.1.63’; S-0682-0003-01,
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134 U. Thant, View from the UN, 48.
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However, the UN officials were complicit in silencing the Papuan population
despite their knowledge of the political activity and Indonesian interference in
the territory. Ultimately, the UNTEA staff’s organisational priorities and racial
prejudices drove their legitimisation of the authoritarian take-over and the perpet-
uation of discriminatory conceptions of the Papuan population within the inter-
national community.
UNTEA staff’s disengagement with Papuan independence was part of a broader
pattern of unequal decision-making and gatekeeping authority wielded by UN
mid-level peacekeepers during decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s.135
Decolonisation’s ‘moment of possibility’ unequally affected different popula-
tions.136 Some causes were internationally championed and others were side-
lined as activists campaigned for recognition in an increasingly competitive
field.137 Global South independence and human rights activists witnessed this
transformation to the international forum and sought to escalate their claims by
engaging in the humanitarian sector through petitions and lobbying.138 However,
the UN officials’ discretional power forged a pervasive hierarchy as the UN staff
oversaw the inclusion – and exclusion – of activists’ petitions, letters, and territorial
representation within international forums. This gatekeeping power extended to
the field-based UN officials deployed to West Papua in 1962–3.
The UN-brokered negotiations for the political future of the island were per-
ceived, by the broader international community and the Papuan population, as a
legitimisation of the New York Agreement; the rights of the Papuans would be
protected if the principles of the UN Charter were followed. However, the terms of
the Agreement conflicted with the demands of political groups within the territory
who were excluded from the discussions between the Netherlands and Indonesian
governments. Thant’s decision-making was driven by geopolitical concerns about
international security in the Pacific region as he sought to prevent the Dutch-
Indonesian skirmishes from evolving into a Cold War conflict. Accepting the colo-
nial administration’s assessment of the Papuan population, those drafting the
Agreement made provisions for the re-colonisation of the territory without any
steps to ascertain bona fide insight into the political aspirations or demands of the
Papuans.139 The UN’s reputational crisis and operational missteps in Congo
prompted the secretary-general to conceive the UNTEA mission as an important
135 Similar dynamics existed in the League of Nations Mandate system and UN Trusteeship Council:
S. Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford 2015); J. Heise and
M. Ketzmerick, ‘Points of division: the role of agency, security and shrinking spaces in the UN
Trusteeship State Building of Togoland and Cameroon’, paper delivered at ISA, 1–3 August 2019 in
Accra, Ghana.
136 F. Cooper, ‘Development, modernization, and the social sciences in the era of decolonization: the
examples of British and French Africa’, Revue d’Histoire des Sciences Humaines, 10, 1 (2004), 33.
137 Heise and Ketzmerick, ‘Points of division’.
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opportunity to demonstrate the institution’s field-based expertise. However, once
on the ground, the UNTEA peacekeepers witnessed the political activity and vital-
ity of the anti-Indonesian activists in each region of the territory. Prioritising
racialised conceptions of the population, the UN staff asserted the political illit-
eracy of the population and securitised Papuan efforts to promote or publicise pro-
independence activism.
The peacekeepers’ awareness of the Indonesian government’s abuses during
UNTEA further complicates the organisation’s projected image as a global pro-
tector of human rights during this period. Despite projecting themselves as part of
a humanitarian organisation, the UNTEA personnel dismissed the attacks on
Papuans and ignored the potential for these abuses to escalate following the
take-over of authoritarian rule in the territory. The UN officials distanced them-
selves and rationalised away the human rights and civil liberties violations in order
to ensure a smooth take-over and protect the desperately required diplomatic
credentials of a ‘successful’ field operation. Thus, by gatekeeping Papuan self-
determination, the UNTEA officials became complicit in re-colonising the territo-
ry and facilitated the perpetuation of racism and violence against West Papuans.
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